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Romantic Rebirth in a Secular Age: Cavell'sAversive Exertions*

RichardEldridge /

Swarthmore
College

"For by thy words," Matthew writes, in a passage Stanley Cavell has
taken as an epigraph to part 3 of his The Claim of Reason,' "thou shalt be
justified, and by thy words thou shalt be condemned." It is possible to hear
in this passage the central themes concerning individuality, community,
and the meaning of life that have shaped Cavell's writing throughout his
career and that have become even more marked in his recent work. It is
by thy words that one will be judged: individuality is something that persons must claim (or refuse) in their expressions if they are to live humanly
and well; it is a task involving the achievement of a voice, not a possession.
But it is by thy words that one must manage this achievement: genuine
individuality can be won only through engagement with our common
inheritances, not through separation or detachment, intellectual or otherwise; philosophy, and the individuality it would support, must speak from
within our common life and language, not from a place apart. It is further
by thy words that one shall be both justified and condemned:there are no
perfect exemplars of individuality and humanity; our best achievements-our actions and relations and utterances that are most worthy of
justification-will at the same time be marked by self-assertiveness, pride,
and rejections of the common that will call for condemnation. Both justification and condemnation will then be forthcoming from the very words
that call for them, as both our individuality and our pridefulness will be
legible in what we have said and done: bythywords shall one be submitted
to judgment.
The task of philosophy, in Cavell's practice, is to animate the "thy," to
call us out of complacency and inexpressiveness in our ordinary routines
and into individuality and humanity. Carrying out this task involves overcoming our attachments to the false necessities of our routines in favor of
the deeper necessity that our humanity express itself. Cavell's views of the
ordinary and of philosophy "respond to the fantastic in what human
beings will accustom themselves to, call this the surrealism of the
habitual-as if to be human is forever to be prey to turning your corner of
the human race, hence perhaps all of it, into some new species of the genus
of humanity, for the better or for the worst. I might describe my philo* Stanley Cavell, In Quest of the Ordinary: Lines of Skepticism and Romanticism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), xiii+200 pp.
'
Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1979).
o 1991 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0022-4189/91/7103-0007$01.00
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sophical task as one of outlining the necessity, and the lack of necessity, in
the sense of the human as inherently strange, say unstable, its quotidian as
forever fantastic" (p. 154). Here our humanity as it is expressed in ordinary practice is both the occasioning object of philosophy, when that
expression is partial or blocked or distorted, and the aim of philosophy,
which seeks humanity's fuller or more adequate expression. The dominant image in Cavell's writing of the refiguring or realigning of the interrelations of our nature and our practice is that of rebirth."The rhetoric of
humanity as a form of life, or a level of life, standing in need of something
like transfiguration-some radical change, but as it were from inside, not
by anything; some say in another birth, symbolizing a different order of
natural reactions-is typical of a line of apparently contradictory sensibilities, ones that may appear as radically innovative (in action or in feeling)
or radically conservative: Luther was such a sensibility; so were Rousseau
and Thoreau."2 And Cavell is himself such a sensibility. His writing
increasingly has the ring of prophecy, as he casts the necessity of a sense of
the strangeness of the human and of the uncanniness of its given routines
as a form of awareness of genuine possibilities of rebirth, while the lack of
this necessity is cast as a form of cowardice or of repression. To refuse this
necessity is to bedim or betray one's humanity by failing to realize that it
has no proper resting place in practice as it either stands or might stand. It
is hence no accident that Cavell has recently insisted on distinguishing
what he does from what ordinarily and naturally goes in a university,
which "is set up to be exactly what the sciences require, say the organized
advancement and transmission of knowledge." Philosophy, the continuing effort to reanimate the human against the grain of practice as it
momentarily stands, "raisesquestions which may be out of order in a classroom so conceived." It involves taking seriously midnight thoughts about
alienation, meaningfulness, distance, and attunement that do not admit of
domestication into a guiding and teachable doctrine of life, which at best
could only hold in place a new form of practice with its own inhibitions of
expressiveness. The activity of envisioning and articulating possibilities of
rebirth into greater expressiveness admits of no resting place.
Yet, for all that Cavell's philosophical writing takes its departure from
the criticism of practice as it stands, there is no effort to leave daily practice behind, to achieve transcendence of the ordinary, or to live in a realm
of the intellect or the divine. Cavell now regularly praises "Emerson and
2 Stanley Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America (Albuquerque, N.M.: Living Batch,
1989), p. 44. It is instructive to note the persistent appearance in Cavell's writing of lists of sensibilities heroically reactive against the deadened donventions of their ages. See, e.g., the similar
lists in The Claim of Reason (pp. 109, 121, 125) and in In Quest of the Ordinary (p. 9).
SStanley Cavell, "An Interview with Stanley Cavell," conducted by James Conant, in The Senses
ofStanley Cavell, ed. Richard Fleming and Michael Payne, Bucknell Review 32, no. 1 (1989): 70.
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Thoreau in their devotion to the thing they call the common, the familiar,
the near, the low" (p. 4). Whatever transfigurations and rebirths there are
to be are to have more the nature of revisionings of ourselves in relation to
our practices than either of revolutions or escapes or of reforms that leave
our conceptions of our interests untouched.4 There is no special domain,
there are no third entities outside our common life, from which philosophy might begin and to which it might lead us: forms, substances, atoms,
and logic are all impotent to play these roles. Nor is there any special class
of persons, distinguished by their cleverness or learning, properly to be
called philosophers. Cavell has learned fromJ. L. Austin's patient interrogations and elucidations of ordinary usage and from Wittgenstein's concern to keep language from going on philosophical holiday to contest the
Platonic conceit that "there is, or ought to be ... a special class of persons
to be called philosophers, who possess and are elevated by a special class or
degree of knowledge" (p. 161).
Here we can see in Cavell the rejection of scientism and of claims to
expertise in philosophy that are typical of Rorty, Lyotard, and other
recent postmodernist writers much influenced by Wittgenstein and
Dewey but without the Humean domestications of our critical ambitions
that are distinctive of these postmodernist figures. Though philosophy
cannot escape the ordinary or criticize it from without, neither is it to be
reduced to mere relaxed chat or to appreciative exchanges of a thousand
points of view, no one of which can engage our passions fully. The difference here is that, for Cavell, unlike Rorty and other postmodernist, pragmatist, domesticating sensibilities, the ordinary is itself fantastic, uncanny,
or divided against itself, filled with both expressions and repressions of
independence and solidarity, ambition and resignation, hope and despair.
Hence Cavell's recent interest in Poe's flat, prosaic, naturalistic
registerings of protagonists' experiences of the extraordinary doubleness
of ordinary things, as in "The Black Cat":
For the most wild, yet almost homely narrativewhich I am about the pen, I neither expect nor solicit belief. Madindeed would I be to expect it, in a case where
my very senses reject their own evidence. Yet, mad am I not-and very surely I
do not dream. But to-morrow I die, and today I would unburden my soul. My
immediate purpose is to place before the world, plainly, succinctly,and without
comment, a series of mere household events. In their consequences,these events
have terrified-have tortured-have destroyed me. Yet I will not attempt to
expound them. [Cited in Cavell, p. 122]
Juxtaposed with the opening paragraphs of Descartes's Meditations, this
passage works "to bring out at once Poe's brilliance (and what is more, his
4See Cavell, This New Yet Unapproachable America, p. 44.
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argumentative soundness) and Descartes's creepy, perverse calm (given
the subjects his light of reason rakes across), his air of a mad diarist" (p.
122). The juxtaposition illustrates, that is, the thought that "the uncanny
vision [is] essential to philosophy-to the extent that philosophy is what
attacks false necessities and false ideas of the necessary" (p. 184) and the
further thought that the ordinary itself provides the resources and occasions for this vision.
This emphasis on the uncanniness of the ordinary as the continuing
inspiration of philosophy is a considerable surpassing and deepening of
Cavell's earlier work on skepticism in philosophy. (The essay "The
Uncanniness of the Ordinary" [pp. 153-78] is the finest overview of his
concerns that Cavell has produced to date.) "Skepticism" now emerges as
the name within philosophy for the nearly primordial experience of the
uncanny or perhaps of what the uncanny itself names: the way in which
our ordinary practices, no matter what their shape, variously but inevitably support and inhibit our humanity and expressiveness. Modern philosophical skepticism captures or expresses this uncanniness. "For me the
uncanniness of the ordinary is epitomized by the possibility or the threat
of what philosophy has called skepticism, understood ... as the capacity,
even desire, of ordinary language to repudiate itself" (p. 154). Hence
modern, post-Cartesian philosophical skepticism is neither the misbegotten and surpassable intellectual by-product of modern science that Rorty
takes it to be nor quite a self-subsisting intellectual problem that is to be
met with a solution or a demonstration of our knowledge. Rather "modern skepticism [is] philosophy's expression or interpretation of the thing
known to literature (among other places) in melodrama and in tragedy ... : roughly, the dependence of the human self on society for its definition, but at the same time its transcendence of that definition, its infinite
insecurity in maintaining its existence" (p. 174).5 This dependence and
transcendence are continually there to be experienced, and such experiences must be continually worked through in the work of writing, not
repressed or dismissed, as we live out our humanity.
The continuing, ineliminable presence of these conditions as occasioning circumstances of both philosophy in general and Cavell's writing in
particular accounts for what might be called the characteristic Romantic
aversiveness of Cavell's writing: its refusal to settle on a formula or doctrine of practical wisdom or of human nature as well as its continual
rebukes to both our sensibilities, perhaps deadened as they stand, and
of skepticism as an expression of an
5 For a fuller elaboration of Cavell's interpretation
ineliminable experience of imperfections of alignment of self and society, see Richard Eldridge,
"'A Continuing Task': Cavell and the Truth of Skepticism," in Fleming and Payne, eds., Bucknell
Review 32, no. 1 (1989): 73-89.
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Cavell's own sensibility, threatened with decay or atrophy. This
aversiveness-to doctrine, to us, and to itself-lends to Cavell's writing a
combination of apocalyptic audacity, as we are criticized where we are,
and strangeness, as we remain uncertain about where to go.6 Aversive
Romantic writing attempts to mark out a continuing path of experience
and life between existentialist anxiety, with its halting collapses, and
sober, scientistic metaphysics, with its inhuman sureties and consecrations
of particular forms of practice. This writing seeks not accumulation, not
bits of knowledge, not information, but onwardness, rebirth, awakening.
Paradise, and groves / Elysian, Fortunate
Compare Wordsworth-"...
Fields-like those of old / Sought in the Atlantic Main-why should they
be / A history only of departed things, Or a mere fiction of what never
was? ... and by words / Which speak of nothing more than what we are, /
Would I arouse the sensual from their sleep / Of Death, and win the
vacant and the vain / To noble raptures . . ."7-with Cavell:
It is [my]historyof devotion to the discoveryof false necessitythat brought me
to the ambiguityof the title I give to these lectures,In Questof theOrdinary;to the
sense that the ordinaryis subjectat once to autopsyand to augury,facingat once
its end and its anticipation.The everydayis ordinarybecause, after all, it is our
habit, or habitat;but since that very inhabitationis from time to time perceptible
to us-we who have constructed it-as extraordinary,we conceive that some
place elsewhere, or this place otherwise constructed,must be what is ordinaryto
us, must be what romantics-of course including both E. T. and Nicholas
Nickelby'salter ego Smike-call "home."... Romanticsare brave in noting the
possibilityof life-in-deathand of what you might call death-in-life. My favorite
Romanticsare the ones (I think the bravestones) who do not attempt to escape
these conditions by taking revenge on existence. But this means willing to continue to be born, to be natal, hence mortal. [Pp. 9, 143]
In In Quest of the Ordinary Cavell himself has become further aware of
how his writing, and its ambitions run alongside the writings and ambitions of central figures in the history of Romanticism. The projects of
Wordsworth, in the "Preface" to Lyrical Ballads (p. 6), Coleridge, in both
"The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" and Biographia Literaria (pp. 56, 57),
6 M. H. Abrams has
recently cited A. C. Bradley on the audacity and strangeness of
Wordsworth's writing and thought: "A. C. Bradley, in an essay on Wordsworth written eighty
years ago, noted how 'audacious' and 'strange' some of his poems are. 'The road into
Wordsworth's mind,' Bradley advised us, 'must be through his strangeness and his paradoxes, not
round them"' ("The Strangeness of Wordsworth," New YorkReview of Books 36, no. 20 [December
21, 1989]: 46). The classic source on Wordsworth's strange adversiveness and homelessness is
Geoffrey H. Hartman's Wordsworth's Poetry, 1787-1814, rev. ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1971). See also Kenneth R. Johnston, Wordsworth and "The Recluse" (New Haven,
Conn.: Yale University Press, 1984).
SWilliam Wordsworth, "Prospectus to The Recluse," in Selected Poems and Prefaces, ed. Jack
Stillinger (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), p. 46, lines 800-804, 811-15.
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Emerson, in various essays, chiefly "Experience," "Self-Reliance," and
"The American Scholar" (pp. 35, 106, 108), Thoreau, in Walden (pp.
171-72, 183), and Poe, in "The Black Cat" and "The Imp of the Perverse" (p. 141), are all described in terms that echo Cavell's characterizations of his own project: making the ordinary interesting, or succumbing
to the temptation to surpass the conventional and exemplifying the difficulty of the return, or making us upright and unapologetic, or "the finding of ecstasy in the knowledge of loss" (p. 171), or raising "the question as
to the existence of myself, or creation of myself" (p. 141). This writing
seeks always "not a state of being, but a moment of change, say of becoming" (p. 111).
The aversiveness and the seeking of becoming in Cavell's writing both
mark a central difference between it and deconstruction, which likewise
but differently casts traditional philosophical texts as writerly effects of
particular experiences. For Cavell, unlike deconstruction, such relation
to traditional philosophical texts as there can and ought to be is not that
of dismissal and not an effect of theory. Deconstruction seems still too
somber and metaphysical, too obsessed with a governing metaphysics of
writing and of philosophy, than does Cavell's concern with particular
texts. Cavell himself notes this difference (p. 132). It is perhaps an inheritance on the part of deconstruction from Heidegger, who also, despite all
his centrality in Cavell's thought, strikes Cavell as soberly metaphysical
and as claiming his own exemption from what he would criticize (p. 159).
Where deconstruction emphasizes the origin of philosophy in will to
power and its ultimate failure, Cavell emphasizes its origin in the primordial midnight (or midafternoon) experience of the uncanny, and he
focuses on particular scenes in texts of partial instruction in, transmission
of, reaction to, and rebirth in culture, rather than on the failure of philosophy (p. 131). (These are matters of tone and of Cavell's Americaness
that are central to placing his project but hard to argue out apart from a
feel for the textures of what Cavell and Derrida, and his epigones, are
variously up to.)
The continuing aversiveness of Cavell's writing, of philosophy itself as
Cavell sees it, immediately raises the question of what kind of return or
recovery from the experience of the uncanny and from philosophy is possible. There is clearly no going back to the experience of the world one
might imagine oneself to have had before the experience of the uncanny,
no return to an undisturbed consciousness. One will continue to experience the world as uncanny, continue to be aware of one's simultaneous
dependence on and transcendence of others, for the uncanny itself names
the experience of the return of familiarity, where awareness of the return
continues to mark the world that is returned. "The return of what we
accept as the world will then present itself as a return of the familiar,
415
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which is to say, exactly under the concept of what Freud names the
uncanny" (p. 166). One will not be able to master the world
metaphysically and to navigate one's way in it through reliance on the
sureties of a theory of what is presented to us in objects or in others. At
best to be returned from the crippling and alienating experience of the
uncanny and to a rebirth in a world of continuing uncanniness will involve
coming to be able to "relate concealment and revelation, or say repression
and power" (p. 168). Acquiring this ability may require in certain ways the
assistance or the shunning of others, the refiguration of one's relations.
Persisting in this acquisition is less an object of knowledge than of anxiety
and of hope. When, following Emerson, we acknowledge this anxiety and
express this hope of continuing return or rebirth, then our "words have
the rhetoric of a bargain or a prayer, as in 'Give us this day our daily
bread'; it is not something to take for granted" (p. 171).
Following Cavell in his efforts at rebirth and through his aversiveness
has curious effects utterly unlike those of what is usually classed as normal,
professional philosophical writing. Cavell's writing can strike one, in its
aversiveness, sometimes as unserious, writerly posturing and sometimes as
the only thing that philosophy can and should be, in proceeding from
awareness of our continuing uncanny dependence on and transcendence
of others. One can feel sometimes that here is a casual spiller of liquid colors and sometimes that here is the only genuinely human voice there is in
philosophy, even in letters at all. The writing itself produces "that hesitation between the empirical and the supernatural on which the experience
of the fanastic [hence of philosophy] depends" (p. 188). The effect
remarkably resembles those that Cavell assigns to the Ancient Mariner's
crossing the line into the polar regions, that is, into reaction against, distrust of, the conventional and acceptance of the uncanny and of hopes of
rebirth. This passage into the polar regions, Cavell finds, makes the Mariner incomprehensible, self-absorbed, narcissistic, outside our ordinary
language, and lonely (pp. 59, 60, 64). It can feel like this to pass into
Cavell's writing; perhaps at times it feels like this to be Cavell.
Passing into the acceptance of the uncanny, into detachment from the
ordinary as it stands and into hope of rebirth within it, with all its continuing uncanniness-that is, following Cavell in his aversive exertions-has
obvious stylistic risks. Cavell's writing can sometimes seem, as he pursues
his interest in his own experiences of the uncanny and of the anxieties and
hopes of recoveries, to alternate between triteness and sentimentality,8 on
the one hand, and willful obscurity, on the other. Cavell himself is more or
8 Michael
Fischer, in his very useful survey focusing on Cavell as a Romantic writer and on the

significance of Cavell's Romanticism for literary theory (Stanley Cavell and Literary Skepticism
[Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989]), penetratingly notes the affinities between tradi-
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less willing to go on suffering these reactions, as he continues, as he puts it,
to "court the transcendental"' without quite claiming its possession.
The stylistic risks of Cavell's aversiveness in courting but not claiming
the transcendental themselves are the sign or surface of three internally
related limitations, but also strengths, in Cavell's writing. Cavell's writing,
far more than most traditional Romantic writing, is first of all markedly
postreligious and Pelagian. It is as though he thinks that by the very
aversiveness, unsettledness, and effort of his writing he could command
his own audience and will both the return of the world and his own salvation. There is very little sense of original sin in Cavell's writing, very little
sense of the need for grace and forgiveness. Though Cavell often writes
about granting others their autonomy and foregoing the effort to possess
them or their sensibilities, he seems less aware of what he may need from
them and too ready to try to exert himself strenuously in writing to command his own fate. The strength of this very limitation, however, is that it
would be very hard to accuse Cavell of complacency in thought or prose.
There is more onwardness to his writing than to that of any other contemporary philosopher or theorist.
Second, Cavell's writing is distinctly antinomian in its earnestness and in
its refusals of doctrine. This antinomianism carries risks of inaccessibility,
hermeticism, and uselessness. The writing seems to provide no ground for
us to stand on. The countervailing strength here is that Cavell refuses the
too-ready sureties of any social or metaphysical theory that might well,
like any theory, issue in formulae of tyranny, as Plato saw in founding the
state on the education of its legislators rather than on a constitution. We
are not to suppose that a formula of value alone can save us.
Third, in taking its departure from the experience of the uncanny,
Cavell's writing is distinctly individualistic and in a way accommodationist
to existing institutions. There is very little expression of concern for justice or for how institutions may work to inhibit or promote it. Worrying
about one's own experiences and recoveries threatens to leave everything
in the public world as it is. It is no accident that Cavell has taken to describing his interest in Emerson as an interest in urging a kind of individual
moral perfectionism. But here, too, there is a countervailing strength.
There is very little naivete in Cavell's writing about the complexities of
the individual person. Theories of justice perforce abstract from these
complexities and perhaps undervalue the capabilities of persons. Cavell is
tional dismissals of Romantic writing and dismissals of Cavell's writing. "When readers dislike
Cavell, they echo the complaints that Romantic literature has always generated, finding him selfindulgent, vague, anti-intellectual, and disorganized" (pp. 3-4).
9 Cavell used this phrase in a discussion period following the presentation of some of his recent
work on Emerson at a plenary session of the International Association for Philosophy and Literature at Emory University, Atlanta, Ga., in May 1989.
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in contrast ready to linger on just how endlessly divided against themselves, anxious, hopeful, and interesting our, and his, individualexpressions are.
There is nothing like Cavell's attention to the complexities of the
expression of our humanity,our uncannydependence on and transcendence of others, in other pieces of writingand speech and in his own, anywhere else in philosophicalwriting. Once we have a sense of what this
attentivenesscan yield, it is very hard,perhapsimpossible,to settle for any
more immediatelyaccessibleand useful, but more primitive,theory of the
human and of justice. It is hence unclear whether there could be philosophicalwriting with the strengthsof Cavell'sin attending to our human
complexity that was not Pelagian, antinomian,and individualistic.But it
seems impossiblenow to honor any socialor metaphysicaltheory that does
not incorporatethe complexly suspended readings of our condition and
our expressionsthat Cavell has made availableto us. How, one wonders,
might we now go on?
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